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background. It is one thing to allow the creditor to exercise his tradi-
tional right to pursue either remedy in the first instance; but it is quite
a different thing to nullify the statutory policy against deficiency judg-
ments by circumlocution. If the creditor may obtain judgment on the
note, levy on the debtor's general assets, and then make up any balance
due by foreclosure, he would be in effect obtaining a deficiency judgment
in advance.
It is held in North Carolina that a mortgagee cannot subject the
mortgagor's equity of redemption to sale under execution for the mort-
gage debt.2 0 If North Carolina were also to hold, in accord with Oregon,
that foreclosure is waived by suit on the note, it would seem that suit
on the note would put the security beyond the reach of the creditor.
RoBIN L. HiNSON.
Criminal Law-Applicability of the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act
to Embezzlement and False Pretenses
In United States v. Turley,1 the Supreme Court of the United States
has settled a conflict between the circuits as to the applicability of the
National Motor Vehicles Theft Act2 to such crimes as embezzlement
and obtaining goods by false pretenses. The Act, more commonly known
as the Dyer Act, reads as follows:
"Whoever transports in interstate or foreign commerce a
motor vehicle or aircraft, knowing the same to have been stolen,
shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than
five years, or both."'3
The area of controversy has been whether to interpret the term
"stolen" as synonymous with common-law larceny, or to allow a broader
interpretation which would include the crimes of embezzlement and ob-
taining goods by false pretenses.
The fifth,4 eighth 5 and tenth0 circuits have held that the term
"stolen" should be limited to the definition of common-law larcency. In
20 McPeters v. English, 141 N. C. 491, 54 S. E. 417 (1906) ; Camp v. Coxe, 18
N. C. 52 (1834).
177 Sup. Ct. 397 (1957).
-41 STAT. 324 (1919), as amended, 18 U. S. C. § 2312 (1952).3 Ibid.
'Murphy v. United States, 206 F. 2d 571 (5th Cir. 1932).
'Ackerson v. United States, 185 F. 2d 485 (8th Cir. 1950) ; United States v.
O'Carter, 91 F. Supp. 544 (S. D. Iowa 1949).
O United States v. Hand, 227 F. 2d 794 (10th Cir. 1955) (dictum) ; (jury found
the defendant intended to steal car from the inception) ; Hite v. United States, 168
F. 2d 973 (10th Cir. 1948).
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Hite v. United States7 where the automobile was obtained by false pre-
tenses, the tenth circuit said:
"... . When a Federal criminal statute uses a term known to the
common-law and does not define that term, the courts will apply
the common-law meaning of the term unless the context indicates
a contrary intent on the part of Congress.... The word 'steal' in
a criminal statute ordinarily imports the common-law offense of
larceny."8
Conversely, the fourth,9 sixth,10 and ninth" circuits have given the
term "stolen," as used in the Act, a broader interpretation which would
include embezzlement and obtaining goods by false pretenses.' 2  The
language of Judge Shackelford Miller, Jr., in United States v. Adcock,'3
a district court case, is adopted by several of the courts taking this view:
"The word stolen as used in the Dyer Act is not used in the tech-
nical sense of what constitutes larceny, but in its well-known and
accepted meaning of taking the personal property of another for
one's own use without right or law; and that such taking can exist
whenever the intent comes into existence and is deliberately car-
ried out regardless of how the person so taking the automobile
may have originally come into posession of it."
Common-law larceny is the obtaining of possession of personal prop-
erty, by trespass in the taking and carrying away of the same, from the
possession of another, and with the felonious intent to deprive him of his
ownership therein.' 4 Thus, there seems to be no problem of interpreta-
tion when an automobile has been taken and carried away with felonious
intent, and without the owner's consent. The difficulty in interpreting
the term "stolen" arises when the title and possession of an automobile
are obtained from the owner by means of a worthless check or the like,
or under circumstances which amount to a bailment. Those courts which
hold the term "stolen" as synonymous with common-law larceny will
not apply the Act here. An example of the reasoning in 'these eases is
7168 F. 2d 973 (10th Cir. 1955).8 Id. at 974-75.
'Boone v. United States, 235 F. 2d 939 (4th Cir. 1956) ; United States v.
Turley, 141 F. Supp. 527 (Md. 1956) rev'd 77 Sup. Ct 397 (1957). Contra, Ex
Parte Atkinson, 84 F. Supp. 300 (E. D. S. C. 1949).
"0 Breece v. United States, 218 F. 2d 819 (6th Cir. 1954) ; Wilson v. United
States, 214 F. 2d 313 (6th Cir. 1954) ; Collier v. United States, 190 F. 2d 473 (6th
Cir. 1951); Davilman v. United States, 180 F. 2d 284 (6th Cir. 1950); United
States v. Adcock, 499 F. Supp. 351 (W. D. Ky. 1943).
' Smith v. United States, 233 F. 2d 744 (9th Cir. 1956).
2 United States v. Sicurella, 187 F. 2d 533 (2d Cir. 1951) (dictum) (The
defendant intended to convert automobile when driven away from the house).
1349 F. Supp. 351 (W. D. Ky. 1943).
14
MILLER, HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW § 109 (1934).
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Ackerson v. United States.15 In that case, defendant wanted to pur-
chase F's car. In return for defendant's check, F gave him title and
possession to the car. Payment of the check was refused by the bank.
In reversing the conviction under the Act, the court held that when an
owner of property, although induced by fraud, intends to and does part
with his title voluntarily, as well as with his possession of the prop-
erty, not expecting the property to be returned or disposed of according
to his direction, it is not larceny, and therefore, not punishable under the
Act.
The courts which hold that the term "stolen" is not the same as
common-law larceny, however, will allow these additional crimes to
come within the scope of the Act. In Smith v. United States,'0 defendant
agreed to drive R's car to Arizona. Without authority, he drove in and
out of several states and was finally arrested in California. In upholding
the conviction of the defendant, the court said: ". . . automobile thieves
may obtain cars in many ways. Typically an unattended car is taken.
However, a thief may give a dealer a worthless check for a certificate of
title. A trusted employee of an automobile dealer may have lawful
possession of the stock of cars and later take them into another state
and wrongfully sell them. These are larceny, false pretenses, and em-
bezzlement situations; but the evil is the same. The owner of the car
is deprived of it and state law is ineffective to protect him.
"Congress would have no reason to differentiate among the various
theft crimes. . . . The courts should not graft such a distinction on
the statute. '1
7
In the principal case,' the Supreme Court, in a six to three decision
handed down by Mr. Justice Burton, reversed the district court and
decided the case in accord with the views of the fourth, sixth, and ninth
circuits that "stolen," as used in the Act, includes embezzlement and
obtaining goods by false pretenses. The Court said :19
". .. The Government's interpretation is neither unclear nor
vague. 'Stolen' as used in 18 U. S. C. § 2312, 18 U. S. C. A.
§ 2312 includes all felonious takings of motor vehicles with intent
to deprive the owner of the right and benefits of ownership, re-
gardless of whether or not the theft constitutes common-law
larceny."
11 185 F. 2d 485 (8th Cir. 1950). The same result would obtain if the situation
were embezzlement.10233 F. 2d 744 (9th Cir. 1956). These courts would hold the same way where
the automobile had been obtained by false pretenses.17 id. at 747.




In the course of its decision, the Court recognized the fact that when
a federal statute involving criminal law uses a term of established mean-
ing at common-law, without otherwise defining it, that term is given its
common-law meaning.20 The Court quotes with approval language found
in Boone v. United States,21 a case which relies mainly upon lexi-
cographers and a quotation from Blackstone, that the term "stolen" was
not equated with larceny at common-law. The Court found support for
its position in the legislative history of the Act, placing particular reli-
ance on the fact that in the committee reports and floor debates of Con-
gress, there was no mention of excluding embezzlement and false pre-
tenses from the Act, and therefore such crimes were intended to be in-
cluded within the coverage of the Act. "No mention is made of a pur-
pose to distinguish between different forms of theft as would be expected
if the distinction had been intended."
2 2
From a reading of the Court's opinion, it would seem that the
authorities and legislative history of the Act militate to require the result
reached.
Notwithstanding those authorities cited by the Supreme Court in the
majority opinion, there is much authority for the proposition that at
common-law the word "steal" was synonymous with larceny.23  In
Gardiner v. State,24 the court said: "The Word steal or stealing in a crim-
inal statute when unqualified by the context signifies a taking which at
common-law would have been denominated felonious and imports the
common-law offense of larceny." And in Dunnel v. Fiske,25 Chief
Justice Shaw said: "The natural and most obvious import of the word.
'steal' is that of a felonious taking of property, or larceny."
Further, in the crime of receiving stolen goods, we find evidence
of the common-law meaning of the term "stolen." Bishop, in his work
20 United States v. Carll, 105 U. S. 611 (1881) ; United States v. Smith, 18 U. S.
(5 Wheat.) 153 (1820); United States v. Brandenberg, 144 F. 2d 656 (3rd Cir.
1944).
21235 F. 2d 939 (4th Cir. 1954).
"77 Sup. Ct. 397, 401 (1957).
.Murphy v. United States, 206 F. 2d 571 (5th Cir. 1953); Hite v. United
States, 168 F. 2d 973 (10th Cir. 1948); Ex Parte Atkinson, 84 F. Supp. 300
(E. D. S. C. 1949) ; State v. Frost, 289 S. W. 895 (Mo., 1926) ; Cohoe v. State,
79 Neb. 811, 113 N. W. 532 (1907) ; Gardiner v. State, 55 N. J. L. 58, 26 Atl. 30
(1892) ; State v. Uhler, 32 N. D. 483, 156 N. W. 220 (1916) ; Riley v. State, 64
Okla. Crim. 183, 78 P. 2d 712 (1938) ; Huges v. Territory, 8 Okla. 32, 56 Pac. 708
(1899). See also 26 AMERICAN AND ENGLISH ENcYcLoPErA OF LAw 769-70 (2d
ed.) ; WEBSTER, NEW IIrmrNATioNAL DIcTIoNARY (2d ed. 1952). "Steal: to take
and carry away feloniously and usually, unobserved; to take or appropriate without
right or leave, and with intent to keep or make use of wrongfully... ."; BLACK, LAw
DicrioxARY (4th ed. 1951). "Steal: the term is commonly used in indictments for
larceny ... and denotes the commission of theft, that is, the felonious taking and
carrying away of the personal property of another, and without right and without
leave or consent of owner. . ..
"55 N. J. L. 58, 60, 26 Atl. 30, 33 (1892).
2552 Mass. (11 Met.) 551, 554 (1846).
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on criminal law, seems to indicate that at common-law "stolen," in this
sense, meant larceny. He points out that it is only by statute that the
receiving of goods obtained by embezzlement and false pretenses is made
punishable.26
The committee reports and floor debates,27 which constitute the
legislative history of the Act, taken as a whole, give the impression that
Congress was confronted with a situation which was purely larceny, and
the Act was passed in order to meet this sitaution.28  There is no men-
tion of embezzlement or obtaining goods by false pretenses in these re-
ports; and although the Supreme Court assumed that if Congress meant
to exclude embezzlement and obtaining goods by false pretenses from
the Act it would have mentioned such a distinction, it seems just as
logical to infer that these crimes were not expressly distinguished, be-
cause Congress was not concerned with those situations.
Three times, at the suggestion of the Justice Department, amend-
ments were proposed to clarify this ambiguous situation by including
these additional crimes. In each instance, the amendment passed one
house of Congress, but failed to come to a vote in the other.29
Mr. Justice Frankfurter writing the dissent3" tersely points out that
the majority of the Court has gone a bit too far in construing the Act.
"If Congress desires to make cheating, in all its myriad varieties, a
federal offense when employed to obtain an automobile that is then taken
across a state line, it should express itself with less ambiguity than by
262 BIsHoP, NEW COMMENTARIES ON THE CRIMINAL LAW §1137(3) (9th ed.
1923) : "Some of the modern statutes in their terms embrace the receiving not only
of stolen but of embezzled goods, those obtained by false pretenses, and the like.
In the absence of such statutes it will not be punishable to receive embezzled
goods." Id. § 1140 (7) : "Though the thing stolen was not the subject of larceny
at the common-law, if it was made such by a statute, the receiving of it is a re-
ceiving of stolen goods." Id. § 1141 (1) : "Where embezzlement is aii offense dis-
tinct from larceny, and the statute contains merely the words 'stolen goods,' the re-
ceiving of embezzled goods is not within the prohibition." See also O'Connell v.
State, 55 Ga. 216 (1875); Commonwealth v. King, 9 Cush. 284 (Mass. 1852);
People v. Montage, 71 Mich. 318, 39 N. W. 60 (1888) ; People v. Seaton, 15 N. Y.
Supp. 270 (1891).
= H. R. Rep. No. 312, 66th Cong., 1st Sess. (1919) ; S. Rep. No. 202, 66th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1919); 58 Cong. Rec. 5470-78, 6433-35 (1919).
2658 Cong. Rec. 5470-78 (1919), Rep. Newton of Missouri said: "... There is
no evil from which there is a greater need for relief than the larceny of automobiles
which is being perpetrated by bands of thieves thoughout the United States.
".... and yet any citizen in any part of the country who leaves his automobile
upon the street while he goes to his office, to the church or the theatre has the
constant dread in his mind that when he returns his automobile may be gone.
"So prevalent has this evil become that scores of anti-theft and auto locking
devicesohave been invented ... and yet so ingenious are the automobile thieves of
the country that as rapidly as devices are invented with which to thwart their evil
work they devise schemes to overcome them .... "
" S. 1483 (S. Rep. No. 358) 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949) ; S. 675 (S. Rep.
No. 2364) 83rd Cong. 2d Sess. § 2 (1953) ; H. R. 3702 (H. R. Rep. No. 919) 84th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1955).
" United States v. Turley, 77 Sup. Ct. 397 (1957) (dissent).
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language that leads three Courts of Appeals to decide that it has not
said so and three that it has." Another point raised by the dissent is
that Congress has included the additional crimes in question here in other
statutes. Section 2314 of Title 18, U. S. C.,31 which deals with the
transportation of stolen goods, securities, monies, or articles used in
counterfeiting, expressly provides for false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations, or promises.
In view of the authorities which apparently can be relied upon for
support of either of the divergent views, possible arguments in favor
of one view or the other must ultimately resolve themselves into differ-
ences of opinion on the concept of the judicial function of which the
Supreme Court is final arbiter. Clearly, the decision has resolved the
conflict and possibly the decision will effect the result which the Congress
would have chosen had it finally passed on this issue. The Supreme
Court, however, may have overlooked the language of Mr. Justice
Holmes in McBoyle v. United States,32 which involved an interpretation
of the same statute:
"Although it is not likely that a criminal will carefully consider
the text of the law before he murders or steals, it is reasonable
that a fair warning should be given to the world in language that
the common world will understand, of what the law intends to do
if a certain line is passed. To make the warning fair, so far as
possible the line should be clear. When a rule of conduct is laid
down in words that evoke in the common mind only the picture of
vehicles moving on land, the statute should not be extended to
aircraft, simply because it may seem to us that a similar policy
applies or upon the speculation that if the legislature had thought
of it, very likely, broader words would have been used."
HENRY H. IS4ACSON.
Criminal Law-Federal Courts-Appealability of Order Suppressing
and Returning Evidence
In United States v. Ponder,' election officials were indicted for
election fraud. Fourteen months earlier the District Court had ordered
certain election ballots, books, and returns impounded on application of
the U. S. District Attorney. After the indictment, and before trial, the
defendants moved for the return and suppression of evidence of the im-
" 48 STAT. 794 (1934), as amended, 18 U. S. C. § 2314 (1952), as amended,
18 U. S. C. A. § 2314 (Supp. 1956) ; See also 37 Stat. 670, as amended, 18 U. S. C.§ 659 (1952) (stealing and embezzlement).
2 283 U. S. 25 (1931).
'238 F. 2d 825 (4th Cir. 1956).
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